When environmental externalities are international -i.e. transfrontier -they most often are multilateral and embody public good characteristics. Improving upon inefficient laissez-faire equilibria requires voluntary cooperation for which the game-theoretic core concept provides optimal outcomes that have interesting properties against free riding. To define the core, however, the characteristic function of the game associated with the economy (which specifies the payoff achievable by each possible coalition of playershere, the countries) must also reflect in each case the behavior of the players which are not members of the coalition. This has been for a long time a disputed issue in the theory of the core of economies with externalities.
Introduction

Ã
We deal in this paper with an economy with several agents, whose productive activities generate ''multilateral'' externalities, i.e., externalities Ã Acknowledgements are due to Karl Gö ran Mäler for numerous fruitful discussions and his hospitality at the Beijer International Institute for Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, during May-June 1992, as well as to Francis Bloch and Jacques Drèze for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. We also benefitted from discussions at seminar presentations made at CORE, the Copenhagen that each one of them can both generate and be a recipient of. We have in mind externalities that are detrimental for the recipients. We also call these externalities ''environmental'' because we assume that they exhibit public goods (actually public ''bads'') characteristics in the sense that when they are generated, they affect all agents in the economy. We should also call them ''additive'' because we further assume that what is received by any recipient is simply the sum of what is emitted by the various generators. For such an economy we call upon the concept of the core of a cooperative game associated with it, in order to identify joint actions that would (a) improve upon inefficient laissez-faire equilibria, (b) achieve Pareto efficiency, and (c) induce this outcome in such a way that it deters both individual and coalitional free riding behaviors.
Being motivated by an interest of long standing 1 for the sources of cooperation between countries on issues of transfrontier pollution (a currently prominent example of multilateral environmental externalities), we shall interpret our model below as one of an international economy, where the countries are also the players in the games associated with it.
2
While other interpretations are conceivable, in our present interpretation the core outcome we are seeking for may be seen as a ''strategically stable'' result of negotiations on joint pollution abatement.
To define the core, the characteristic function of the game -which specifies the payoff achievable by each possible coalition of players -must also reflect, in the case of games with externalities, the behavior of the players which are not members to the coalition. This is a disputed issue, and alternative assumptions in this respect lead to alternative core concepts such as, e.g. the a-and b-cores. These are studied and contrasted to each other in various externalities contexts by Scarf (1971 ), Starrett (1972 and Laffont (1977 (chapter V) ).
3 However, when using one of these assumptions in analyzing international environmental negotiations by Business School, the Séminaire Cournot (Paris I), the 1994 FEEM-IMOP workshop ''Environment: Policy and Market Structure'' in Athens, and the 1994 Maastricht meeting of the Econometric Society. This work was initially stimulated by the European Science Foundation programme ''Environment, Science and Society''. The first author is grateful to the California Institute of Technology for providing an adequate environment for completing this research. The second author thanks the Fonds de la Recherche Fondamentale Collective, Brussels (convention n82.4589.92) and the Commission of the European Communities (DG XII: Project ''Environmental Policy, International Agreements and International Trade'') for their support.
1 A first version of the international environmental model alluded to here was given in Tulkens (1979) , and elaborated upon from a game theoretic point of view in Chander and Tulkens (1991 ), (1992a ) and (1992b 2 The ''acid rain game '' of Mäler (1989) is a similar international environmental model, to which we apply, in Chander and Tulkens (1995) , the concepts and results developed 3 The issue also arises in games associated with economies with public goods, as in Foley (1970), Champsaur (1975) , Moulin (1987) and Chander (1993) .
